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Abstract
We estimate the determinants of capital intensity in Japan and the US, char-
acterized by striking diﬀerent paths. We augment an otherwise standard Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) model with demand-side considerations, which we
find especially relevant in the US. In this augmented setting, the elasticity of sub-
stitution between capital and labor is placed around 0.85 in Japan, and 0.30 in
the US. We also find evidence of biased technical change, which is capital-saving
in Japan but labor-saving in the US. These diﬀerences help us explain the diverse
experience in the capital deepening process of these economies, and lead us to con-
clude that demand-side drivers may also be relevant to account for diﬀerent growth
experiences. A close look at the nature of technological change is also needed before
designing one-size-fits-all industrial, economic growth, and/or labor market policies.
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1 Introduction
Although capital intensity, i.e. the ratio of capital stock over employment, plays a central
role in economic growth models, it is generally considered as an input variable. No eﬀort
is devoted to the empirical assessment of its determinants in spite, for example, of the
contrasted trajectory of capital intensity across countries, or in spite of the limitation that
this imposes in growth accounting analysis.1
This paper intends to fill this void by providing evidence on the determinants of capital
intensity in two economies with diﬀerent trajectories: Japan and the United States. As
shown in Figure 1, the diﬀerent time paths followed by the capital-per-worker ratio is
itself calling for an empirical analysis of its causes.
Figure 1. Capital intensity.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Japan
United States
In
de
x 
10
0 
= 
19
60
a. Levels
-2
0
2
4
6
8
60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
Japan
United States
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
b. Growth rates
Source: Ameco Database.
The progress of capital intensity was especially intense in Japan, where the amount of
capital stock per employee grew almost sixfold between 1960 and 2011, in contrast to the
US, where it less than doubled (Figure 1a). The origin of these diﬀerences lies in the very
dynamic process of capital deepening linked to the industrialization process experienced
by Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. However, after peaking in the first half of the 1970s,
the growth rate of capital intensity has evolved around a steady downward path (Figure
1b). On the contrary, the process of capital deepening in the US accelerated from the mid
1980s until 2009 when the Great Recession caused a sudden fall similar to those occurred
in the aftermath of the oil prices shocks.
To investigate on the determinants of capital intensity, we depart from a standard Con-
stant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) model —along the lines, among others, of Antràs
(2004) and McAdam and Willman (2013)— and relax the assumptions of perfect compe-
tition and perfect information. In this way, we force firms to deal with product demand
1Madsen (2010), for example, points out that a problem associated with the traditional growth
accounting framework is the lack of information about the factors responsible for the evolution of capital
intensity.
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uncertainty, which they do by adjusting their degree of factor utilization ex post, once
investment decisions have already been made. In this context, capital intensity is driven
by supply-side factors (i.e., factor costs and technology) as well as by demand-side con-
ditions. The result is a model of capital intensity where the capital-per-worker ratio is
explained by the relative factor cost —which is the main supply-side driver—, relative fac-
tor utilization —which is the main demand-side driver—, and technological change —which,
as standard, is assumed to grow at a constant rate—. Following related literature (e.g.,
Madsen, 2010; and Hutchinson and Persyn, 2012), additional empirical controls related
to the tax system and the degree of exposure to international trade are considered.2
In this way, our paper contributes to the literature in three main dimensions. First of
all, in considering an extended CES model with demand-side considerations arising from
the existence of imperfect competition and imperfect information. Second, in providing
an empirical account of the determinants of capital intensity in this wider than usual
perspective, including updated estimates of the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor. Third, in identifying the diﬀerent nature of factor-biased technical change in
Japan and the US, in response to the recent ‘call for results’ by McAdam and Willman
(2013, p.698): “... despite renewed interest in models of biased technical change, the
corresponding empirical eﬀort to identify (i.e., measure) episodes from macro data has
been lacking.”
Our estimated models are used to conduct dynamic accounting exercises. In each of
them, the time path of capital intensity is evaluated as a result of diﬀerent counterfactual
scenarios that aﬀect each empirical determinant of capital intensity.
As expected, we find relative factor costs to be crucial in explaining the time-path
of capital intensity in both countries. But, beyond that, we also find that relative factor
utilization accounts for a significant chunk of its progress (or, better, of its lack of progress)
in the US. Finally, the diﬀerent nature of the biased-technological change is shown to exert
the opposite influence on the progress of capital intensity. It has contributed to slow it
down in Japan, due to its capital-saving nature, while it has boosted it quite intensively
in the US because of its labor-saving essence. Our simulations also point to growing
openness to trade in Japan as a relevant factor hindering the process of capital intensity.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical
framework. Section 3 deals with empirical issues related to the data and the estimated
models. Section 4 computes the elasticities of substitution between capital and labor, and
evaluates technological change in Japan and the US. Section 5 presents counterfactual
2A diﬀerent way of looking into capital intensity is the one by Hasan et al. (2013) in a Hecksher-Ohlin
setup. They argue that labor and capital market regulations determine the industry-level capital stock
per worker, and claim that restrictive labor laws can curb firms’ ability to adjust their labor demand to
shocks in demand, technology and trade.
3
simulations. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Analytical framework
We depart from a CES production function from which the factor demand equations are
first derived, and then combined into a single expression that accounts for the supply-side
determinants of capital intensity. This is along the lines of Antràs (2004) and McAdam
and Willman (2013). Then, we add the possibility of product demand uncertainty in the
spirit of Andrés et al. (1990a, 1990b), Fagnart et al. (1999) and Bontempi et al. (2010).
In this context, when expected demand is not met by its actual value, firms are likely to
react by adjusting their use of the production factors either by hiring or firing workers, by
changing the rate of capacity utilization, or by using both mechanisms. In other words,
the uncertainty on the actual level of product demand creates a transmission channel by
which the demand-side conditions aﬀect the investment and hiring/firing decisions of the
firms. This explains why capital intensity is likely to depend both on supply-side and
demand-side factors.
2.1 Factor demands and capital intensity
Consider an economy with  identical firms that supply a homogeneous good. These firms
acquire inputs in competitive markets and face a cost per unit of labor  , and a cost of
capital use . Each firm has a CES production technology so that:
 = £( )− + (1− ) ( )−¤−1  (1)
where  is output,  is employment,  is capital stock,  is an index of labor-
augmenting eﬃciency (proxying Harrod-neutral technological change), and  is an index
of capital-augmenting eﬃciency (proxying Solow-neutral technological change); the para-
meter  represents the factor share (0    1);  = 1
1+ is the constant elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor; and  denotes the degree of substitutability
between both factors.
As standard (Antràs, 2004; León-Ledesma et al., 2010), we assume that biased tech-
nological progress grows at constant rates denoted, respectively, by  and  . We thus
have  = 0   and  = 0  , where 0 and 0 are the initial values of the
technological progress parameters, and  is a linear time trend. Note that  =   0
would imply Hicks-neutral technical progress;   0 and  = 0 implies Solow neu-
trality;   0 and  = 0 yields Harrod neutrality, while     0 but  6=  is
indicative of factor-biased technical change.
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Profit maximization in a perfectly competitive environment yields expressions for the
factor demands (as a proportion of total output) that log-linearized can be written as
log() =  −  log()− (1− ) (2)
log() =  −  log()− (1− )  (3)
where  is the aggregate product market price;  =  log(1 − ) + ( − 1) log0 and
 =  log  + ( − 1) log0 are constants; and 1 −  = 1+ . Subtraction of equation
(3) from equation (2) yields the following specification for capital intensity:
log() = −  log() + (1− )( − ) (4)
where  =  −  .
Equation (4) is standard and corresponds, for example, to equation (3’) in Antràs
(2004, p. 19) and equation (5) in McAdam and Willman (2013, p. 704). Following this
expression, capital intensity depends on two supply-side factors: (i) the relative cost of
labor and capital; and (ii) the direction of factor-biased technical change. In other words,
there will be more capital intensity whenever real wages grow faster than the user cost
of capital, thus making labor relatively more expensive than capital; and whenever labor-
eﬃciency grows faster than capital-eﬃciency (  ), provided that labor and capital
are gross complements, i.e.   1.
2.2 Product demand uncertainty
Next, we relax the assumption of perfect competition and perfect information in the prod-
uct market by assuming that firms hold some market power and are subject to random
unexpected shocks. This implies that firms will now maximize profits based on an expec-
tation of the stochastic demand  . Uncertainty about aggregate demand shapes firms’
investment decisions (Fagnart et al., 1999; Bond and Jenkinson, 2000; Bontempi et al.,
2010) and allows for the inclusion of demand-side considerations.
The sequence of decisions is as follows. Firms maximize profits subject to their expec-
tation of demand in period . In +1, once the realization of the random (and unexpected)
shocks that determine the demand are known, the utilization rate of installed capacity
and the corresponding demand for labor are adjusted accordingly.
Along the lines of Fagnart et al. (1999) firms use a putty-clay technology. With
productive capacity fixed in the short-run, firms adjust the degree of factor utilization,
and capital and labor are substitutes ex ante. Ex post, once capacity choices have been
made and idiosyncratic shocks are known, firms’ actual demand is faced by adjusting
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the utilization intensity of the production factors; i.e., by hiring/firing workers, and by
deciding on the capacity utilization rate. At this stage, production factors may be thought
as complements to achieve a certain level of production. This model, therefore, allows for
ex post rationing of factor utilization in contrast to the standard maximization problem.
The realization of the demand faced by firms depends on two factors: the price level
(chosen by firms) and random shocks. The expected demand that firms consider in their
profit maximization problem is the expected value of this realization   :
  = −1 [( )]  (5)
where  is the rational expectations operator, and  is represents an idiosyncratic (sto-
chastic) shock with zero mean and a constant standard deviation greater than zero. In
other words, firms produce (and decide their factor demands) accordingly to their expec-
tation of product demand, which is a function of the the aggregate product market price
and the shocks.
Under these assumptions, the profit-maximization problem of the firm corresponds to
a standard monopolistic competition case:
max  (  ) =   − − 
subject to :
  = −1
£(0  )− + (1− ) (0  )−¤−1
where  stands for the firms’ profit function.
Operating from the first order conditions of this problem, the optimal levels of factor
utilization relative to output are obtained as an inverse relation with respect to each
factor’s cost:

  = (1− )

µ

¶−
(0  )
−
1+ (6)

  = 

µ

¶−
(0  )
−
1+ (7)
Note that log-linearization of equations (6) and (7) under perfect competition and perfect
information would yield equations (2) and (3).
Through aggregation of the  firms, the overall expected demand can be replaced by
the potential aggregate demand level (ˆ ). Further addition of the ratio  (= 1) to the
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left-hand side of both equations then yields:

 = (1− )

µ

¶−
(0  )
−
1+
b
 (8)

 = 

µ

¶−
(0  )
−
1+
b
  (9)
where the ratio  expresses the gap between potential aggregate demand (ˆ ) and the
actual level of aggregate production ( ), once factor demands have been adjusted ex post.
2.3 Mind the gap
The  ratio is the transmission channel for business cycle eﬀects (Fagnart et al., 1999;
Nakajima, 2005; Planas et al., 2013). As such, it is directly related to the gap between
total installed production capacity and the rate of capacity utilization of the production
factors. However, since b is unobservable, we follow the literature and assume that the
degree of factor utilization can be empirically used as a proxy of the ratio  .
Regarding equation (8), the natural proxy is the standard capacity utilization rate
() variable —see, among others, Graﬀ and Sturm (2012). In this paper, however, we
are also interested in equation (9) and require a specific proxy for the demand-pressures
aﬀecting the labor factor. For this, we follow the same reasoning than the one normally
used for equation (8).3 Thus, based on the fact that production is responsive to aggregate
demand ex post, and installed capacity is rigid in the short run, we consider the employ-
ment rate ( = ), which reflects the actual use of the labor factor (employment,
) relative to its total potential use (working-age population, ).
Accordingly, we re-write the factor demand equations as:

 = (1− )

µ

¶−
(0  )
−
1+ () (10)

 = 

µ

¶−
(0  )
−
1+ () (11)
where (·) are monotonically increasing functions of  and  (see Andrés et al.,
1990a, p. 88).
Log-linearization of equations (10) and (11), and subtraction of the second one from
3Although firms invest in capacity following their expectation on potential demand, they end up using
it based on the actual demand they face (this is the idea of ex post rationing) determining, in this way,
their degree of capacity utilization (or capacity utilization rate).
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the first one yields an expression for capital intensity and its determinants:4
log
µ

¶
= − 
∙
log
µ

¶
− log
µ

¶¸
+ (1− ) ( − ) 
(12)
+( − ) [log ()− log ()] 
Note that the only diﬀerence with respect to equation (4) is the last term, which
results from the assumption of stochastic behavior of aggregate product demand allowing
for ex post rationing of factor utilization.
2.4 Factor-biased technical change
The empirical measurement of factor-biased technological change is a critical issue —see,
among many others, Antràs (2004), León-Ledesma et al. (2010, 2013), and McAdam and
Willman (2013). In this context, making a priori assumptions about the form of technical
progress (e.g. assuming Hicks neutrality) is likely to misguide the insights on the eﬀect
of technical progress, for example, on capital intensity. This is the reason why it is worth
paying close attention to the second term in the right-hand-side of equation (12).
Achieving a balanced growth path (BGP) in standard models of economic growth im-
plies that the main macro variables converge to a common growth rate, the underlying
ratios (factor income shares and factor to GDP ratios) remain constant —as described
by Kaldor (1961)—, and technical change is solely labor augmenting (i.e., Harrod neu-
tral). Acemoglu (2003) and McAdam andWillman (2013) suggest that although technical
progress is labor-augmenting along the BGP, it can be capital-augmenting in medium-
run transitions away from the BGP. With an elasticity of substitution between labor and
capital diﬀerent from unity, this pattern allows for long-run asymptotic stability of factor
shares and, also, for a non-stationary evolution in the medium-run, which we actually
observe in reality.
In the context of our model, let us consider a situation in which the elasticity of
substitution between labor and capital is below unity (and the production factors are
gross complements). As shown by McAdam and Willman (2013, p. 703), this implies
that capital intensity grows with a relatively higher growth of labor-augmenting technical
change:
()
()  0 if   1 (13)
4Consistently with the rest of the variables, we assume that the log-linearization of (·) yields a linear
function of the logs of  and  as presented in (12).
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which, in terms of equations (4) and (12), takes place whenever    . On the contrary,
with   1 and    , there is a fall in capital intensity.
This situation of   1 is empirically endorsed in the works of Antràs (2004), Chirinko
(2008), Chirinko et al. (2011), León-Ledesma et al. (2010), Klump et al. (2012), and
McAdam and Willman (2013).
3 Empirical issues
3.1 Estimated models
We augment the base-run equation (12) with two sets of control variables related to capital
intensity: the degree of exposure to international trade and the fiscal system. Since
capital intensity, the degree of substitution between capital and labor, and globalization
are deeply intertwined (Hutchinson and Persyn, 2012), inclusion of the degree of trade
openness () is a must. Regarding the fiscal system, a key variable for firm’s decisions is
direct taxes on business, which is crucial in defining, for example, investment decisions.
This has been studied in Bond and Jenkinson (2000), Edgerton (2010) and Madsen (2010),
where the decelerating eﬀect of corporate taxation on capital deepening is explained as
a disincentive to firm-level investment. Because we originally have one expression per
production factor, we consider both direct taxes on business
¡ ¢ and direct taxes on
households
¡¢ to capture, if any, the specific impact of taxes on each factor. Of course,
payroll taxes is another crucial element of the tax system, but its relevance is more related
to the wage bargaining process between firms and workers. Since this is implicitly taken
into account through the wage variable in the user cost of capital (total compensation,
which includes social security contributions), no further control is required.
Following this reasoning, the first model we estimate is a straightforward augmented
version of equation (12):
 = 0 + 1( − ) + 2( − ) + 3+ 4 + 5  + 6 + 1 (14)
where  = log(),  = log (),  = log (),  = log()
 = log() and 1 represents a standard error term with zero mean and constant
standard deviation. This is called Model 1 in Tables 2 to 5. Note, also, that detailed
definitions of the additional controls, ,  ,and  (and also of the rest of the variables)
are given in Table 1.
We consider a second model because the choice of demand-side drivers in factor
demand equations is still an open issue, and we want to know how robust their in-
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clusion is. This is the reason why, on top of the relative degree of factor utilization
log ()−log (), we follow Añón-Higón (2007) and consider the variation in worked
hours per employee as an alternative aggregate proxy of demand-side pressures (we take
the growth rate because this proxies the business cycle in terms of time-varying demand-
side pressures). The reasoning behind this choice is that worked hours per employee
reflect simultaneously the increase in the usage intensity in both capital stock and labor.
Moreover, the average annual amount of hours worked per employee is likely to avoid
the endogeneity problems that would entail considering variations in output (since the
dependent variable is indeed made of capital and labor), which is the natural alternative
in the literature.
Following this reasoning, in Model 2 we substitute relative factor utilization, −,
by the change in worked hours per employee (∆):
 = 0 + 1( − ) + 2∆−1 + 3+ 4 + 5  + 6 + 2 (15)
where 2 represents a standard error term with zero mean and constant standard de-
viation. Note that the coeﬃcient on hours is lagged once to help avoiding endogeneity
problems. In contrast, the term capturing demand-side pressures in equation (14) is not
lagged to maintain coherence with respect to the theoretical model. We have assumed
a putty-clay technology and argued that short-run capital stock adjustments take place
through changes in the degree of capacity utilization. This implies that demand changes
foreseen in − 1 are accommodated through changes in investment, not through changes
 which can only respond in period .
A crucial remark is that these empirical models are estimated as dynamic equations to
take into account the adjustment costs potentially surrounding all variables involved in the
analysis (endogenous and exogenous). The lagged structure of the estimated relationships
is therefore a strict empirical matter.
The coeﬃcients 11 are associated to the relative cost of production factors, and a
negative sign is expected. As the wedge between the cost of factors ( − ) increases,
capital becomes relatively more costly than labor, and a deceleration in the growth capital
intensity is expected.5 The crucial feature of these coeﬃcients is their correspondence with
the constant elasticity of substitution between capital and labor ().
The coeﬃcients 22 are associated to the role of demand-side pressures, and a
positive sign is expected. A rise in the wedge between the relative intensity in factor
5Decisions to invest in new capacity are influenced by the cost and availability of capital and the
target rates of return sought by firms and financial institutions. The dependence on bank loans is an
important factor limiting expansion and the user cost of capital is a crucial factor in the expected net
return to investment by firms.
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utilization (− ) implies that tightness in the capital side is larger than in the labor
side. Firms, therefore, are expected to react by investing more intensively than embarking
in new hirings. As a consequence, capital intensity is expected to accelerate.
Firm’s decisions to expand capacity through investment are based to a large extent
on their assessment of their future sales, which we assumed to be uncertain. Managers
are naturally cautious about overestimating future sales, as the penalty for doing so
tends to be much greater than for losing potential business by failing to expand (Smith,
1996). In our model, the capacity utilization rate is a proxy for the perception of the
firm of the economic reality, which reflects on its expectations on aggregate demand.
Since the expansion of capacity drives investment, we expect a positive eﬀect on capital
intensity when the wedge between a higher degree of capacity utilization rate and a higher
employment rate widens.
Given the assumption of constant rates of technical progress, the coeﬃcients 33 =
(1 − )( − ) measure an asymmetric progress in the eﬃciency of each production
factor. If ˆ3ˆ3  0 and ˆ  1, there is evidence that labor-augmenting eﬃciency grows
faster than capital-augmenting eﬃciency (the same holds in case of opposite signs in both
estimates). If, on the contrary, the ˆ3ˆ3  0 are positive and ˆ  1, the conclusion is
that capital-augmenting eﬃciency grows faster than labor-augmenting eﬃciency. In both
cases, therefore, there is evidence of biased technological change, something that in the
standard Cobb-Douglas framework, where ˆ = 1, cannot be measured.
3.2 Data
We use annual data obtained from various sources. From the European Commission’s
Ameco database we take long-time series on net capital stock.6 Data on the capacity
utilization rate is obtained from Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry for Japan, and
from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for the U.S. The rest of the
variables is gathered from the OECD Economic Outlook.
Table 1 provides the concrete definitions of the empirical variables used. All of them
are standard and the only clarification refers to the definition of the user cost of capital,
which is constructed as 

 (+  −∆) assuming a constant depreciation rate, , equal
to 01. All variables will be used in logs so as to allow an unambiguous interpretation of
the estimated coeﬃcients as elasticities.
6The net capital stock at constant prices is computed as  = −1+[−( :
) ∗ 100], where OIGT = Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices; UKCT = Consumption
of fixed capital at current prices; and PIGT = Price deflator gross fixed capital formation; and OIGT
= Gross fixed capital formation at constant prices in construction; equipment; products of agriculture,
forestry, fisheries and aquaculture; and other procucts.
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Table 1. Definitions of variables.
 real net capital stock  GDP deflator
 employment  investment deflator
 capital intensity (=  − )  depreciation rate
 working-age population  nominal interest rate
 employment rate (= − )  real user cost of capital
 capacity utilization rate =  (+  −∆)
 real compensation per employee  direct taxes on business
 hours of work per employee   direct taxes on business () as % GDP
 GDP = log ( )
 exports of goods and services  direct taxes on households () as % GDP
 imports of goods and services = log ( )
 trade openness  linear time trend
= log ([ + ]  ) ∆ diﬀerence operator
 constant
Note: All variables used in the econometric analysis are expressed in logs.
3.3 Estimation procedure
Time series estimates need to ensure that the long-run estimated relationships between
capital intensity and its determinants are non-spurious. Of course, if , , , , , ,
 , and  certainly behaved as (1) variables we could argue, since we work with these
variables in ratios (  −   −  ( +) and  ), that we end up dealing
with  (0) variables and cointegration issues are of no concern.
However, unit root tests show that some of these ratios behave as  (1) variables (see
Table A1 in the Appendix for the tests results). This is why our estimation is conducted
following the bounds testing approach, or ARDL (AutoRegressive Distributed Lag) ap-
proach, which yields consistent short- and long-run estimates irrespective of whether the
regressors are (1) or (0). This approach, which was developed by Pesaran and Shin
(1999) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001), provides an alternative econometric tool
to the standard Johansen maximum likelihood, and the Phillips-Hansen semi-parametric
fully-modified Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) procedures. The main advantage of the
bounds testing approach is the possibility of avoiding the pretesting problem implicit in
the standard cointegration techniques. It also yields consistent long-run estimates of the
equation parameters even for small size samples and under potential endogeneity of some
of the regressors (see Harris and Sollis, 2003).
We proceed as follows. We first estimate our models by OLS, and select equations
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that are dynamically stable and satisfy the conditions of linearity, structural stability,
no serial correlation, homoscedasticity, and normality of the residuals. Then, among
the models that meet these requirements, we select the dynamic specification of each
equation by relying on the optimal lag-length algorithm of the Schwartz information
criterion (Table A2 in the Appendix shows that these standard diagnostic tests are all
passed at conventional significance levels). Then, to make sure that we have obtained
non-spurious relationships between potential non-stationary variables, we verify that the
residuals resulting from our estimated models are indeed stationary (see Table 4 below).
Finally, we estimate the selected specifications by Two Stages Least Squares (TSLS)
so as to control for potential endogeneity biases in the estimated eﬀect of the relative
factor costs ( − ), in relative factor utilization ( − ) or hours, and in direct
taxes on business. The instruments are statistically significant and we find the OLS and
the TSLS results to be relatively alike, thus supporting the robustness of the estimated
relationships.7
4 Results
4.1 Estimated equations
We present the estimation results for equations (14) and (15) in Table 2, for Japan, and
Table 3, for the US.
Japan’s estimation includes three dummy variables 9102, 83, and 97, which take
value one, respectively, in 1991-2002, 1983, and 1997. They account for the lost decade,
and specific events such as the East-Asian crisis, and help to achieve better results in
terms of the misspecification tests (displayed in Table A2).
The estimated coeﬃcient associated to the first lag of capital intensity is large in all
estimated equations. This high persistence is to be expected since productive capacity is
not easily changed in the short run. Relative factor costs in Japan are highly significant
and with the expected negative sign in both models. Regarding the demand-side proxies,
hours worked in Model 2 have greater statistical significance than the employment rate in
Model 1. Direct taxes, both on businesses and households, exert the expected decelerating
eﬀect on capital intensity in the two models, as also does the degree of openness to
international trade.
Finally, the estimated coeﬃcient associated to the time trend is negative. Combined
with a lower-than-one elasticity of substitution, this is indicative that capital-associated
7Although, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of exogeneity is rejected by a short margin in Model 2
for Japan, this is not aﬀecting our empirical conclusions because our simulation exercises are based on
Model’s 1 estimates.
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eﬃciency grows at a higher rate than labor-associated eﬃciency (a detailed discussion on
this issue is provided in Section 4.2).
Table 2. Japan, 1980-2011.
Model 1 Model 2∗
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
 0005
[0983] 0084[0759]  −0020[0907] −0008[0969]
−1 0964
[0000] 0954[0000] −1 0966[0000] 0960[0000]
 −  −0033
[0000]
−0038
[0001]
 −  −0034
[0000]
−0036
[0062]
∆ ( − ) 0020
[0001] 0019[0003] ∆ ( − ) 0021[0000] 0031[0030]
∆ (−1 − −1) 0015
[0002] 0016[0005] ∆ (−1 − −1) 0021[0001] 0025[0004]
 −  0005
[0625] 0003[0813] ∆−1 0076[0106] 0111[0070]
∆ ( − ) 0015
[0188] 0019[0175]
∆  −0015
[0001]
−0014
[0012]
∆  −0014
[0001]
−0007
[0573]
∆−1 −0007
[0329]
−0006
[0426]
∆−1 −0009
[0149]
−0010
[0200]
 −0030
[0003]
−0035
[0008]
 −0035
[0001]
−0056
[0002]
9102 0005
[0005] 0005[0024] 9102 0004[0005] 0003[0039]
83 −0014
[0000]
−0013
[0000]
83 −0014
[0000]
−0014
[0000]
97 −0010
[0000]
−0011
[0000]
97 −0010
[0000]
−0009
[0034]
 −0001
[0030]
−0001
[0145]
 −0001
[0016]
−00003
[0605]
 1676 16733
 32 32 32 32
Notes: LL = Log-likelihood; p-values in brackets; Instruments: −1 −1 −1
∆−1 ∆−1 −1 −1 −1 ∆−1 ∆  ∆ −1 9102 83 97 
∆−1 ∆−2.
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test [prob]: Model 1 [0.95]; Model 2 [0.04].
As for the US, the coeﬃcients associated to relative factor cost are also negative and
significant. And, in contrast to Japan, not only ∆−1 presents statistical significance,
but also the relative factor utilization. Direct taxes and openness are also detrimental
for capital intensity, with the latter entering the equation in diﬀerences. This implies
a long-run elasticity of capital intensity with respect to the level of openness cannot be
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computed. We interpret this as a reflection of a more conjunctural than structural type
of influence in a context of a closed economy, in contrast to Japan.
The estimated coeﬃcient associated to the time trend is positive. Taking into ac-
count that the estimated elasticity of substitution for the US is lower than unity, this is
indicative of labor-saving biased technical change resulting from faster growth rates of
labor-eﬃciency than those of capital-eﬃciency (details in Section 4.2).
Table 3. US, 1970-2011.
Model 1 Model 2∗
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
 0345
[0401] 0327[0516]  0136[0772] 0286[0582]
−1 0951
[0000] 0941[0000] −1 0973[0000] 0965[0000]
∆−1 0292
[0015] 0308[0038] ∆−1 0215[0241] 0288[0176]
 −  −0010
[0094]
−0016
[0132]
 −  −0013
[0058]
−0011
[0443]
 −  0083
[0139] 0126[0192] ∆−1 −0310[0317] −0204[0572]
∆ ( − ) −0182
[0000]
−0170
[0001]
∆−2 0526
[0027] 0547[0026]
  −0019
[0069]
−0035
[0114]
  −0018
[0115]
−0008
[0699]
 −0002
[0899]
0003
[0862] 
 0014
[0366] 0011[0535]
∆ −0099
[0024]
−0069
[0382]
∆ −0149
[0002]
−0206
[0002]
 0001
[0079] 0001[0191]  00002[0655] 00004[0492]
 1612 1555
 42 42 42 42
Notes: LL = Log-likelihood; p-values in brackets; Instruments: −1 ∆−1
−1 −1 −1 −1 ∆−1 ∆−1    −1  −1 ∆−1 
∆−1 ∆−2
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test [prob]: Model 1 [0.92]; Model 2 [0.73].
Beyond the use of the ARDL methodology, we further ensure the validity of the
estimated long-run relationships (with the key ones presented in Table 5) by testing for
the existence of unit roots in the residuals of the estimated equations. For this, we use the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF, with the null hypothesis of non-stationarity) and the
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS, with the null hypothesis of stationarity).
The results of these tests are presented Table 4 and reject, in all cases and by large, the
existence of a unit root in the ADF test, and fail to reject the hypothesis of stationarity
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in the KPSS test. We thus conclude that the residuals are stationary and we can safely
compute the key long-run relationships.
Table 4. Unit root tests on the residuals of equations (14) and (15)
ADF test KPSS test
Model 1 (1) Model 2 (2) Model 1 (1) Model 2 (2)
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
Japan −584 −532 −547 −661 0054 0045 0447 0500
U.S. −417 −618 −641 −689 0054 0042 0081 0083
Note: ADF test critical value is -3.60 at the 1% level.
KPSS test critical values are 0.739 at the 1% level, and 0.463 at the 5% level.
4.2 Elasticities of substitution and technological change
Directed technical change is a consequence of a production factor becoming relatively
more scarce, more expensive, or both. Innovation is then directed towards technologies
that would save on the relatively more expensive factor. The bias in technical change
may have a saving eﬀect on one factor and an augmenting eﬀect on the other one. The
degree of substitutability between labor and capital is closely related to this phenomenon.
They are, together, key variables in economic growth models, with special influence in
medium-run dynamics as explained in McAdam and Willman (2013).
Table 5 shows the elasticity of substitution between factors implied by our empirical
models (ˆ), together with the long-run impact on capital intensity of the constant rate
of technological progress
¡−¢. Given that the estimated models are dynamic, the
elasticity of substitution is computed as the long-run elasticity of  with respect to
(− ). Taking the example of Japan using Model 1, we have 0038(1−0954) = 083 = ˆ.
In turn, − = (−0001 (1− 0954)) ∗ 100 = −22%.
These two values are used to compute the implied rate of biased technological change
following equations (4) or (12). More precisely, in case of Model’s 1 estimates for Japan,
we use ˆ = 083 and − = −22% to compute the value of ( − ) using:
−22% = (1− 083)( − )
=⇒ ( − ) = 125%
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This result implies that there is factor-biased technical change in Japan ( −   0,
that is,  6= ) and the direction, in this case, is capital saving.
Table 5 shows the calculations for both countries using the instrumental variables
estimation of Models 1 and 2.
Table 5. Elasticities of substitution and technological change.
Model 1 Model 2
Technical progress Technical progress
ˆ − Type Rate ˆ − Type Rate
Japan 0.83 -2.2% Capital 12.5% 0.90 -0.7% Capital 7.5%
saving saving
US 0.27 1.7% Labor 2.3% 0.31 1.1% Labor 1.7%
saving saving
Notes: − denotes the long-run elasticity of capital intensity with respect to constant
technical change; technical change is capital saving whenever   and labor saving
whenever   .
As noted, we find the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor to be below
1 in Japan. This value is larger than in other studies, which place it between 0.2 and
0.4 (Rowthorn 1999, Klump et al. 2012). However, neither the sample period nor the
methodology is common to the one followed here.
We find the long-run impact of technological change to be between -0.7% and -2.2%.
This implies that a rise in the rate of technological progress is translated, in the long-run
and ceteris paribus, to a fall in capital intensity. This result is critical to understand the
deceleration in the process of capital deepening experienced by Japan since the mid 1970s.
Together with the estimated elasticity of substitution, it provides evidence of a substantial
bias in technological change, which is capital saving, and evolves at a rate between 7.5%
and 12.5%. The capital-saving eﬀect comes from the fact that a higher rate of capital
related eﬃciency growth (i.e.,   ) reduces the pace of capital stock growth. This
is consistent with the path followed by the process of capital deepening in Japan, with a
huge increase in capital accumulation in the expansionary decades of 1960 and 1970, and
a steep and continuous decrease in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. On this account, let us
recall that our sample period for Japan starts in 1980. Not only this prevents us to have
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noise from the structural break occurred in the Japanese economic growth model, but
it also allows us to capture more precisely this extraordinary long period of continuous
deterioration in the ratio of capital stock to employment.
Regarding the US, our analysis yields an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor around 0.3, a value in the lower range of the estimates provided by the literature.
In particular, although Chirinko (2008) finds a  between 0.4 and 0.6, and León-Ledesma
et al. (2010) and Klump et al. (2007) present values in the 0.5-0.7 range, it is important
to emphasize Chirinko’s et al. (2011) indication that the use of time series data at annual
frequencies may lower the estimation of .8 Chirinko et al. (1999), for example, provide
an estimation of the elasticity of substitution rather low for the US of around 0.25.
We also find a long-run impact of technological change on capital intensity between
1% and 2%. This implies that a rise of 1 percentage point in the rate of technological
progress is translated, in the long-run, in at least a 1% increase in capital intensity. In
terms of biased technological change, we find consistent evidence (since Models 1 and
2 yield similar results) of a labor-saving bias (i.e., labor-related eﬃciency grows at a
faster rate in the U.S.,   ). This may contribute to explain the secular process
of industrial firms’ delocalization of the US economy including the growing relevance of
phenomena such as oﬀshoring and outsourcing.
It is important to remark that our estimates between 1.7% and 2.5% of biased tech-
nological change in the US are fully aligned with those supplied by the literature and
summarized in Klump et al. (2012), Table 1. The reported range of values obtained from
many studies is placed between 0.27% and 2.2%, with the exception of Antràs (2004)
where it is placed slightly above 3%.
5 Counterfactual simulations
Takahashi et al. (2012) show that capital intensity has been crucial in Japan and other
OECD economies’ postwar growth. Few eﬀorts, however, have been made to assess the
determinants of the economies’s capital intensity in such long-run perspective. To con-
tribute to such important matter, we now use our estimated models to perform dynamic
accounting exercises.
For each country, the estimated Model 1 is solved in two scenarios. The first one
is a baseline scenario in which all exogenous variables take their actual values. In the
second scenario, each of the exogenous variables (one at a time) is kept constant at its
8Chirinko et al. (2011) argue that time series variations of investment spending largely reflect adjust-
ments to transitory shocks; then, because firms respond less to temporary than to permanent shocks, an
elasticity estimated with time series data will tend to be lower than the “true” long-run elasticity.
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value at the beginning of the sample period (1980 for Japan, 1970 for the US). We call
this a counterfactual simulation because the diﬀerence between the fitted values of capital
intensity obtained with the actual and the simulated values of the explanatory variables
reveals how much of its actual trajectory can be explained by the factor kept constant in
the simulation.
Note we are not claiming that the fitted values from the simulated scenarios are the
true values that capital intensity would have taken had some particular variable remained
constant. It is just a dynamic accounting exercise to assess which have been the main
driving forces of capital intensity in the two examined economies.
Figure 2 plots the results. The scale in all graphs is based on a 100 index for the
first year of the sample period. To evaluate these results it is helpful to take into account
the evolution of the exogenous variables which is plotted in Figures A1 and A2 in the
Appendix.
The actual path of capital intensity is represented by the continuous line. With a
98.9% growth, it almost doubled in Japan between 1980 and 2011, while in the US it
grew by 65.9% over the 1970 to 2011 period.
Following our simulations, had relative factor costs ( − ) remained unchanged at
the beginning of the sample, these growth rates would have been around 40% (38.4% in
Japan and 40.2% in the US). This is the outcome of the decline in the relative cost of
factors that both countries have experienced in last decades. This implies that the fall
in the relative factor costs, with capital becoming secularly cheaper, has been a relevant
source of capital accumulation and, thus, of progress in capital intensity. This is specially
so in Japan, where the diﬀerence between the two scenarios amounts to 50 percentage
points of growth, half the actual progress in capital intensity.
In contrast to Japan, in the US it is the evolution of relative factor utilization what
explains most of the progress. This is the outcome of the estimated coeﬃcients —recall
that the demand-side drivers had a stronger explanatory power in the US than in Japan—,
but also of the trajectories of the variable  −  (depicted in Figures A1 and A2). In
Japan its has an oscillatory evolution, with a fall in the 1990s and a steep rise over the
2000s whereas in the US it is more homogeneous, with a downward trend over the sample
period that ends up explaining a significant portion of the evolution of capital intensity.
In the absence of this downward trend, capital intensity would have grown by 176.8%
rather than by 65.9% (Figure 2b). This means that steady demand-side pressures may be
notably influential in the process of economic growth. Therefore, the fact that pressures
on the rate of capacity utilization have been systematically less binding than pressures
on the employment rate (as uncovered by the steady fall in the relative factor utilization
variable  − ) appears as a clear-cut disincentive for US firms to keep investment at
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the same path than the Japanese firms, where this was not occurring.
Another interesting result arises when technology is not allowed to progress. The
outcome of this simulation clearly uncovers the dramatic opposite influence of a factor-
biased technological change that is capital saving in Japan, but labor-saving in the US
(Figure 2c). This implies that capital intensity has been hindered by technical progress
in Japan —had it not been there, capital intensity would have grown by 162.3%, rather
than by 98.9%—, and has been boosted in the US, where in the absence of labor-saving
progress in technology would have left capital intensity virtually unchanged.
Figure 2: Simulation results.
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b. Relative factor utilization ( − ) kept constant
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Figure 2 (cont.)
Japan U.S.
d. Openness to trade () kept constant
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One of the critical changes experienced by the Japanese economy in last decades has
been a globalization process by which the degree of openness to trade, which had already
increased in the 1960s and 1970s, doubled between 1980 and 2011. Our simulations show
that this process has been as influential as the evolution of relative costs in shaping the
trajectory of capital intensity during this period, but in the opposite sense (Figure 2d):
in the absence of such opening process, capital intensity in Japan would have progressed
by almost 150% (instead of close to 100%). The results for the US are not comparable,
since they are based on keeping the growth rate of openness at its large 1970 value (6.5%)
relative to an average growth rate of 2.8% during the sample period. The result from this
simulation is that had the exposure to international trade kept growing so rapidly, capital
intensity would have been lower. Thus, the negative impact of trade on capital intensity
is a common feature of Japan and the US.
Finally, direct taxation has negative eﬀect on the evolution of capital per worker. As
shown in Figures A1 and A2, taxes have not grown in last decades. Had they stayed at
their 1970 and 1980 values, capital intensity would have grown around 8 percentage points
less in each country (i.e., 91% in Japan, rather than 99%, and 58% in the US, rather than
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66%).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper focuses on a generally unattended issue: the determination of capital intensity.
The capital-per-worker ratio is usually considered as an input in growth accounting, and
the empirical assessment of its determinants has been a rather neglected topic.
We develop an analytical setting that extends, with demand-side considerations, the
models in Antràs (2004) and McAdam and Willman (2013). In this setting, we estimate
empirical models for capital intensity that include supply- and demand-side determinants,
technology, and relevant controls related to international trade and the tax system.
We confirm the relative cost of production factors as a main supply-side driver of
capital intensity yielding, also, plausible estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor. The two proxies accounting for the demand-side pressures are also found
relevant in the US, and partly so in the case of Japan. This calls for a wider than usual
approach when working with production factor demands and, as we have done in this
study, when examining the determinants of capital intensity.
Along the lines of recent works stressing the relevance factor-specific eﬃciency growth
—Acemoglu (2003), Klump et al. (2012), McAdam and Willman (2013)—, the diﬀerent
nature of technological change in Japan and the US has been also uncovered. As we
have argued, this diﬀerence provides an explanation of the contrasted evolution of capital
intensity in these economies, and even of their diverse growth models; Japan having been,
traditionally, one of the great world net exporters and the US having been, and being,
one of the greatest net importing economies.
Policywise, our results warn about a simplistic design of policies exclusively based
on supply-side considerations. On the supply-side, our findings call for a careful design
of policies aﬀecting firms’ decisions on investment and hiring. The reason is that these
policies crucially aﬀect the procyclical behavior of the ratio between the rates of capacity
utilization and (the use of) employment, since in economic expansions the capacity uti-
lization rate tends to increase proportionally more than the employment rate, probably
because in the very short run it is less costly to use already installed capacity than to hire
new workers. From this point of view, the design and implementation of labor market
reforms should be closely connected to investment policies, a conclusion already obtained
in Sala and Silva (2013) in their analysis of labor productivity.
In general, demand-side forces are not included in economic growth models. Nonethe-
less, our results reveal the incidence of demand-side pressures on the evolution of capital
intensity, specially in the US, where the growth path of capital intensity could have been
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much steeper without the fall in the relative factor utilization rate. Considering that
capital intensity is a key growth driver, this result has important policy implications in
the fields of economic growth and development.
To conclude, there are three sources of potential improvements in this analysis. The
first one is the introduction of imperfect competition in factor markets. There is work
done regarding the labor market (Raurich et al. 2012), but financial markets, and the
associated mark-up over the marginal product of capital, should simultaneously be eval-
uated. The second one, as explained in León-Ledesma et al. (2010), is to block potential
identification problems by moving from single-equation estimates of the elasticity of sub-
stitution to multi-equation systems in which output and all factor demands are modeled.
The third avenue for improvement is to relax the assumptions on technological change
and devote further eﬀort in modeling eﬃciency progress by explicitly considering R&D
and innovation. Future research will have to face these compelling challenges.
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Appendix
Table A1. Unit root tests of main variables.
Japan US
 −   −   ∆  −   −   ∆
ADF 033(1) 071(1) −111(1) 003(1) −480(0) 318(1) −094(1) −245(1) −025(1) −495(0)
KPSS 072(1) 070(1) 020(0) 061(1) 013(0) 078(1) 054(1) 075(1) 081(1) 023(0)
Result (1) (1) – (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test. Hypothesis of unit root.
1% and 5% critical values = -3.66 and -2.96 respectively.
KPSS = Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin Test. Hypothesis of stationarity.
1% and 5% critical values = 0.739 and 0.463 respectively.
Table A2. Misspecification tests.
Japan US
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS OLS TSLS
SC [2(1)] 001
[0931] 008[0772] 153[0216] 064[0425] 052[0470] 0003[0960] 001[0916] 217[0141]
HET [2()] 983
[0364] 755[0580] 805[0529] 804[0530] 109[0615] 998[0696] 102[0602] 903[0700]
ARCH [2(1)] 052
[0470] 188[0170] 009[0770] 004[0853] 195[0163] 161[0204] 016[0693] 006[0801]
NOR [] 157
[0457] 187[0392] 146[0481] 093[0627] 047[0791] 162[0445] 045[0799] 125[0534]
Notes: p-values in brackets.
SC = Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation of residuals;
HET = White test for Heteroscedasticity; NOR = Jarque-Bera test for Normality
ARCH = Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity;  = number of coeﬃcients
in estimated equation (intercept not included).
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Figure A1: Actual evolution of the main variables in Japan. Index 100 in 1980.
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Supply-side factor (cc-w )
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Demand-side factor (cur-nr)
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Openess to trade
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Direct taxation
DTB growth
DTH(-1) growth
Figure A2: Actual evolution of the main variables in the US. Index 100 in 1970.
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